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 Modern issues 
Questions concerning the definition and ontology of diseases – and of psychologi-
cal or mental diseases in particular – are live ones in the modern world. It will be 
helpful to offer a brief summary of these issues as they exist in the modern philos-
ophy of medicine and in contemporary thought about psychiatry. This is not done 
in the belief that the terms of the modern debate can always be mapped straight-
forwardly or usefully onto those of the ancient ones – nor will any such operation 
be attempted systematically in what follows. There is, however, a fundamental 
sense in which the same questions are being addressed; and, more specifically, 
there are points of relevance and connection – some more direct than others – 
between the terms of the conceptual discussions, and approaches to the problems, 
then and now. Especially in the context of a comparative volume such as this, it 
seems worthwhile to consider these contemporary questions as a background, or 
first point of orientation, to which reference and comparison will be made from 
time to time in the detailed historical analysis which follows. 
A first and central opposition in the modern debate is between naturalist and 
normative (or constructivist) accounts, the former insisting on a specific, and 
therefore objectively assessable, biological dysfunction as the criterion of dis-
ease, the latter pointing to the culturally conditioned nature of disease concepts, 
involving as they do notions of correct or appropriate performance of functions 
and interaction with society. 1 A further possible criterion is that of the individual’s 
own experience of illness; and some would suggest a combination of the three 
elements (biological, social and subjective) as constitutive of disease.2 Such an 
approach raises the question whether all, one or some combination of the three 
must be present; and this in turn touches on two related questions in the definition 
of disease: that of gradualism and the question whether diseases admit of defini-
tion in terms of a single, clear and necessary criterion (or a distinct number of cri-
teria), or are better regarded as ‘cluster concepts’.3 The phenomena of health and 
pathology seem to exist in a continuum: what does one do, definitionally, about 
borderline or intermediate cases? And can disease concepts reliant on a range 
(even on a numerical score) of symptoms, no single one of which alone has to be 
present, be taken as adequate and appropriate within an evidence-based medicine 
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In a sense underlying (or perhaps better, running in parallel to) all the above 
questions is the fundamental one, whether or to what extent diseases can be 
regarded as natural kinds – a question which itself unavoidably recalls the ancient 
discourse, the Platonic–Hippocratic notion of ‘carving nature at the joints’4 being 
frequently invoked in such discussions.5 There is, further, the question of whether 
the ‘kinds’ in question are distinguished in terms of their symptomatology and 
pathogenesis (a conception which would correspond very approximately to the 
domain of prognosis in the ancient medical discourse), or whether rather aetiol-
ogy is the ultimate defining notion. (Would two patients with identical symptoms, 
and even identical future pathology, be regarded as having different diseases, if a 
different causal account is identified in the two cases?) 
All the above arguments have been summarised as relevant to disease (and 
health) in general, rather than in relation specifically to the mental domain. In fact, 
most of them arise and are pursued far more actively within the philosophy of 
psychiatry – and indeed within debates relating to psychiatric practice itself – than 
in the more general area of philosophy of medicine (although in principle most 
of the theoretical concerns are common to both); and most of the literature just 
cited addresses the psychiatric or mental area specifically. The focus on mental, 
as opposed to general medical, diseases and their diagnosis is at once a complicat-
ing factor and one which throws these questions into sharper relief. The former, 
because it involves one in the further question of the definition of the ‘mental’
itself (and, in our specific case, in the further complexity of the relationship of 
our conception of the mental to ancient ones), and of the relationship of mental 
to physical phenomena or symptoms; the latter, because the question of ‘culture-
specific’ versus ‘natural’ arises much more obviously and acutely in this area. So, 
for example we have the well-known issues of the historical medicalisation of 
homosexuality; of the problematic nature, in terms of empirical or objective basis 
(let alone relationship to ‘natural kinds’) of a number of contemporary diagnoses, 
especially those involving a spectrum, a problematic threshold and qualitative and 
arguably subjective criteria of assessment (e.g. autism; certain personality disor-
ders); and, more generally, the question of the over-medicalisation, or increasing 
medicalisation, of states of mind or responses that could well be argued to be 
rational or normal, e.g. that of grief. 
Although this extremely brief overview can do little more than point towards 
the complexity of the problems and living nature of the debate, it is hoped that it 
will provide a relevant background through consideration of which our analysis 
and appreciation of the ancient debate will be sharpened. 
Ethical or medical? 
A further point of contact – again, possibly oblique – between ancient and modern 
discussions relates to the possible understanding of mental aberrations in either 
medical or ethical terms: what is crudely summarised as the ‘mad or bad’ ques-
tion, in relation to aberrant or pathological behaviour. To move to ancient Greek 
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shall see, used both in medical discussions of cognitive or mental impairment 
and in ethical ones on the cure of the ‘affections of the soul’. The terms of this 
debate are not directly similar to our ‘mad or bad’ debate; 6 and indeed the fact 
that the same term is used, in two different kinds of pathological context, is not, 
in general, problematised. But a question arises as to whether some mental aber-
rations are the province of the doctor and some of the philosopher – and, if so, 
what is the relationship between the two kinds of affliction and their treatment. In 
fact, a parallelism between the health of the soul and the health of the body – in 
which the former is an essentially philosophical or ethical and the latter a medical 
concern – is a recurrent trope in Plato, who uses it to establish the importance of 
the philosopher’s expertise as both similar in its beneficial function and superior 
to the doctor’s. 7 That Platonic distinction, as we shall see, will have far-reaching 
consequences for the pragmatically dualistic conceptions in play in later authors 
and, arguably even more significantly, for the establishment of a philosophical 
‘therapy of the soul’ existing alongside medical practice. 
Ancient definitions of health and disease 
We proceed to consider ancient definitional approaches to health and disease and 
to their relationship, with a main focus on Galen, but also a consideration of how 
his approach may mark him off from predecessors as well as from rivals. 8 We
begin with the theorisation of health (and of its relation to disease), in which area 
it is easier to place Galen’s views in a broader socio-intellectual context than it is 
with his definitional approach to disease itself. It is fundamental for Galen that 
health is understood in terms of balance; but it is also vital to be more precise. In 
his major work on prescriptions for health he clarifies: (1) that health consists in 
a balance, specifically, of the uniform or homogeneous parts (flesh, blood, bone, 
etc.); (2) that the health of the (higher-level) organic parts consists in the correct 
shaping, number, composition, etc., of these; and (3) that a central criterion of 
health is that one’s ‘activities are functioning according to nature’. 9 Both the two-
level account of health – in terms of the ‘mixture’ of the lower-level bodily parts 
and in terms of the organs – and the focus on performance of natural functions are 
central to Galen’s view. 
Another distinctive feature – and one which is interesting in relation to the 
‘gradualist’ debate mentioned earlier – is that health must not be understood as a 
single, ideal state, but as involving a latitude (platos).10 In stating this view, Galen 
mentions unnamed others who hold to the doctrine of aeipatheia – perpetual 
pathology. Galen finds such a view absurd, insisting that the only sensible way to 
conceptualise health is as containing different gradations; it is, further, important 
to use the individual’s normal constitution, rather than an abstract standard, as 
the criterion of his or her health: there are thus also different individual types or 
versions of health. In this context (significantly in relation to the discussion of 
subjective versus objective criteria of disease), Galen focuses on the patient’s own 
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The tripartite division of states – healthy, unhealthy and ‘neither’ (or neutral) – 
attributed to Herophilus and entertained in places by Galen himself12 is also rel-
evant here. This could be seen as offering another kind of answer to the modern 
‘gradualist’ problem. The existence of an active debate in this area is attested also 
by both Celsus and Caelius Aurelianus. The former offers a distinction,  within the 
category of the healthy, between those in a strong or robust state of health and 
those in a weaker or more precarious one.13 The latter mentions authorities both 
for the view that health is single and indivisible (Asclepiades, Erasistratus) and 
for the opposite view whereby the concept admits of levels or degrees (Herophi-
lus, the Methodists).14 
An interesting distinction emerges, in Graeco-Roman society, between a domain 
of ‘matters of health’ (or ‘hygienic’), that is, the preservative/dietetic branch of 
healthcare, and one of clinical or therapeutic medicine, each with its own distinct 
procedures. Galen’s massive treatise,  Matters of Health (or Hygiene; De sanitate 
tuenda), is devoted precisely to the former discourse, that of the relevant prescrip-
tions for health preservation and restoration of minor faults (which consist largely 
in diet, exercise, baths, etc., rather than in pharmaceutical or surgical interven-
tions); it also spends some time focusing on the identification of the boundary 
line between the two discourses. But the distinction is attested in other sources 
as well as Galen;15 and the notion that there is an important and rich domain of 
medical expertise which is relevant within healthy states, as opposed to medicine 
being a science or practice addressed only to the pathological, is perhaps one of 
the most distinctive and interesting findings of Graeco-Roman medical thought, 
in the contrast and challenge it presents to modern conceptions. 
We turn to the definition of disease itself. Here again Galen gives us a fuller 
fundamental definitional and conceptual account (or accounts) than any other sur-
viving source. It is, in fact, impossible to do justice in a summary to the complex-
ity and variety of Galen’s definitional and classificatory approaches (on the latter, 
more in sections 5.2–5 that follow), their fundamental principles and the nature of 
their interrelations.16 Three features, however, should be emphasised as ones that 
inform his approach and run through the texts: (1) the fact that the account of dis-
eases is inextricably linked to an aetiological account within Galen’s physical and 
physiological system; (2) the two-level approach, considering disease of uniform 
parts (understood in terms of mixture) on the one hand and that of the organic 
on the other; (3) the understanding of disease in terms of impairment of natural 
capacity or function. (Points 2 and 3 have already been observed in relation to the 
definitional account of health.) 
 Disease ( nosos) is (1) the opposite of health; and (2) a condition leading to 
impairment of activity. 17 Galen also states here that it is unimportant whether one 
defines health and disease in terms of state or of function, the former being caus-
ative of the latter. What is important is that impairment of function provides the 
fundamental criterion of disease.18 Central, too, is the focus on the causal account. 
At the level of the uniform parts, then, disease is also equated, in line with Galen’s 
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(dyskrasia): bad-mixtures turn out to offer a hugely powerful explanatory model 
for the inception of diseases in the body. 19 Galen offers further elaboration of 
the fundamental categories (with much terminological subtlety), in a way which 
again highlights the relationship between states and their underlying or preceding 
causes.20 As we shall see in more detail in what follows, Galen elaborates this 
basic concept of impairment of function (in particular, distinguishing between loss 
of function and disorder of function, and between impairment of ‘psychic’ and 
‘physical’ activities) 21 to characterise different  kinds of diseases; we shall consider 
too the relationship of disease entities to these fundamental explanatory categories. 
Graeco-Roman disease classification: some interpretive approaches 
We turn now to the principles of individual disease classification. As a preliminary 
methodological consideration before moving to the historical detail, I suggest the 
following four interpretive accounts or approaches to the question: what is the 
fundamental motive or underlying principle of ancient Graeco-Roman theory and 
practice in this area? 
1 distinction of diseases or symptoms according to an aetiological account, 
based on each medical author’s individual theory (this would correspond 
roughly to the modern ‘naturalism’ approach identified earlier) 
2 identification of pathologies, and their related treatments, by clusters of 
symptoms or by single definitional feature 
3 employment of traditional and/or patient categories used in description of 
disease 
4 deployment of a rhetoric of knowledge, of modes of exposition aimed at 
success in a specific competitive intellectual environment or at specific 
paedagogic goals 
It should be emphasised immediately that these are not suggested as mutually 
exclusive. There may, for example, tend to be a considerable overlap in the poli-
cies implied by (1) and (2), the focus on aetiology or on distinct sets of symptoms, 
while either of those two, but especially the latter, may also be somewhat co-
extensive with (3), that is to say that traditional categories, or those understood 
by patients, may underlie the medically understood conceptions or clusters or 
symptoms. Interpretation (4), meanwhile, should also be seen as potentially coex-
isting with the others: the fact that a medical author is seriously concerned with 
matters of disease definition and aetiology, or indeed that he is engaging with 
or developing traditional or patient categories, does not mean that he is not also 
involved actively in a highly competitive socio-intellectual milieu, within which 
success – in gaining students or followers as well as patients – is measured partly 
through highly public rhetorical and intellectual displays and the deployment of 
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Graeco-Roman accounts of ‘mental’ disorder
The causal accounts: an overview 
As is well known, the Hippocratic text The Sacred Disease attacks one particu-
lar aetiological account of a psychological disturbance – the notion that the so-
called ‘sacred disease’ is caused by divine intervention. Consideration of this 
type of causal view takes us beyond the medical literature to other sources. In 
Greek tragedy, especially, madness (usually defined explicitly as  mania , although 
other terms are used) is typically presented as a temporary or episodic visita-
tion inflicted by a god, usually as punishment for a transgression.22 Although the 
notion of divine or external agency is not a significant one in the Graeco-Roman 
scientific writing on physical pathologies, a couple of provisos should be made to 
that statement. One is that there is acknowledgement of a possible astral influence 
on character and even explicitly on the ‘affections of the soul’ – which, as we 
shall see, are in some sense mental aberrations – both by Galen and by Ptolemy. 23 
The other is that, towards the end of the period under consideration, the Christian 
notion of daimonic possession becomes a possible, albeit disputed, explanation 
of two mental disturbances in particular,  epilēpsia and ephialtēs.24 Moreover, we 
should guard against the temptation to assume that the distinction between divine 
and physical causation is always, in ancient medical thought, a straightforward, 
‘either–or’ decision – a caution that applies to the argument of  The Sacred Disease
itself and is relevant to the medical texts and authors of the later period, too.25 
Hippocratic causal accounts of human pathology generally focus on the nature 
and action of certain, usually fluid, substances in body. (It should also be borne in 
mind – a point of significance in relation to our history of aetiological accounts and 
their status – that some Hippocratic texts, such as Epidemics, rely on no theoretical 
physical model, or at least no clear and explicit one.) Some form of humoral the-
ory underlies most medical writings on pathology in the Roman imperial period, 
including those of Celsus and Aretaeus (but see further later on on Empirics and 
Methodists).26 The related account in Galen focuses rather on elements or quali-
ties, and their mixture, as the fundamental level of explanation, although these are 
also (at least at certain points in Galen’s writing) intricately related to humours or 
fluids. As we have seen, elements and their mixture (including  dyskrasia, ‘bad-
mixture’) have enormous explanatory weight in this system. But one should also 
bear in mind that in Galen the account is much more heavily theorised, both in 
terms of levels of composition within the body and – in line with the very signifi-
cant developments in anatomy that had taken place between the Hippocratic period
and his, especially in the third and second centuries BCE – in terms of anatomical 
structures. As we have already seen, a crucial distinction for Galen is between 
imbalances of (low-level) uniform parts and various disorders at the organic level; 
but it is also the case that the specific location of a disease, or of its origin, is cru-
cial (a point developed at length in Affected Places). (We touch here on a topic of 
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question of ‘holism’, and the senses in which ancient medical theories and prac-
tices were or were not holistic.)27 
In the specific context of mental disorders, as we shall see further later on, two 
Galenic developments are especially noteworthy. First, he makes a fundamental 
distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘psychic’ activities, and their impairments, with 
a further subdivision of the ‘psychic’ into sensory, motor and ‘hegemonic’; this last
category covers reason, memory and the formation of sensory impressions, and is
thus the one most clearly relevant to ‘mental disorder’. Secondly, he suggests a 
correspondence between specific functions, and therefore their impairment, and 
different parts or aspects of the brain (locations, solid bodies or fluids contained). 28 
The Galenic account was not, of course, the only contender. Galen’s insistence 
on complex and precise knowledge of internal structures, their capacities and 
pathologies, was in direct conflict with, in particular, the views of the Empirics 
and Methodists (to which school one of our other major sources, Caelius Aurelia-
nus, theoretically belongs), against whom he polemicises on those grounds.29 It 
is, indeed, possible to argue – adopting here an element of approach (4) above – 
that his insistence on this anatomical and physiological knowledge is motivated 
precisely by the competitive intellectual requirement to dominate over these other 
groups; or, conversely, that their theoretically minimalist views were developed 
as a more accessible ‘lay’ account, in conscious opposition to the complexities 
and excessive theoretical pretensions of the Galenic approach. Thus, we have, in 
Empiricist medicine, a deliberate refusal to commit oneself to theoretical proposi-
tions on the functioning of the body and causes of disease; and in Methodist medi-
cine, a physiological theory, certainly, but one which is so reductionist and simple 
as to appear almost anti-theoretical. While the Empirics offer an essentially prag-
matist view, whereby repeated observation of the similar will lead to therapeuti-
cally valid results, without the need to develop a theory about the internal causes, 
the Methodists function with an anatomically unsophisticated theory of some kind 
of channels (poroi) running throughout the body, the dilatation or constriction of 
which accounts for all pathological states. 
Perhaps the most interesting result, however, to arise from this theoretical bat-
tlefield is that the same practical approaches, the same cures – and even, to a 
considerable extent, as we shall see, the same conceptual disease entities – seem 
to have been shared by a wide range of practitioners with, in principle, utterly 
opposed epistemological and/or physiological models. (Galen indeed highlights 
this point, criticising predecessors who agree with him on therapeutic practice 
while subscribing to a fundamentally different theory – a clear sign, to Galen, of 
their inconsistency.) 30 Most strikingly of all, there seems little fundamental differ-
ence in the repertory of remedies, and overall therapeutic approach, or even in the 
distinction of disease entities, between the other authors, whose pathology is one 
of humoral fluids, and Caelius Aurelianus, whose theoretical model attributes all 
diseases to constriction and relaxation. Even allowing for a degree of eclecticism, 
or for the notion that Caelius (or his archetype, Soranus) may have been a less 
than doctrinaire Methodist, we seem inescapably drawn towards the conclusion 
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that diagnostic and clinical practice – including disease classification – operated 
in a very real sense in parallel with and separately from fundamental physical 
theory, rather than being closely dependent on it. 
Disease entity or not: phrenitis, mania, melancholia 
By the Roman imperial period, the terms phrenitis, mania and melancholia have 
become well established as the major terms corresponding to what we would call 
mental or psychological disorder (epilēpsia and lēthargos are also particularly 
relevant). All these have now become definite disease entities: they are conceptu-
ally distinct, and real, medical events involving distinct clusters of symptoms, 
aetiologies, treatments and sets of possible or expected outcome. 
The terms have a long previous history, going back to the Hippocratic period; 
but it seems clear that this distinct conceptualisation is a more recent phenom-
enon. As Chiara Thumiger has shown, within the Hippocratic Corpus  phrenitis
is the only ‘mental’ disorder to reach the status of something recognisable as a 
disease entity. 31 It seems significant, too, that the entity in question is a temporary, 
acute disturbance, its central features being fever and some kind of loss of cogni-
tive faculty, including hallucination. It might rather be regarded as a kind of fever 
which is accompanied by psychological symptoms than a category of psychologi-
cal disturbance, let alone ‘mental illness’ in any stronger sense. Thumiger also 
persuasively argues for the significance of the predominance of  verbs over nouns
in the Hippocratic accounts related to the three main ‘mental illnesses’.32 The case 
of phrenitis, where the noun is frequent, is distinguished from those of mania and 
especially of melancholia (or rather of their cognates), where verbal formulations 
predominate (the noun melancholia appears only three times in the corpus). Thus, 
melancholia ‘fluctuates . . . between affect, behavioural traits and episode’, while 
mainesthai (the verb form cognate with mania) is ‘an activity that can characterise 
different ailments’. Thumiger makes a parallel with the notion of a recipe, which, 
she suggests, ‘in the case of phrenitis appears to be already reasonably fixed and 
clear, while in the case of  melancholia competing versions are present’.33 
The situation is different in Roman imperial times, although the difference is not
entirely straightforward: the position in Galen (our overwhelmingly largest medical
source for the period) seems to be somewhat different from that in our other major
medical sources for mental disturbance, Celsus, Aretaeus and Caelius Aurelianus.
The latter three authors all organise their account by disease type: disease enti-
ties are to the fore, first of all as a function of the very structure and organisa-
tion of the text. There are considerable differences of detail: Celsus prefaces his 
nosological account with substantial methodological discussion, covering first 
theories of disease (book 1, preface) and then the overall characteristics of dis-
eases, in terms of causes, signs and treatments (book 2), and thus pays consider-
ably more attention to aetiology and physical explanation than do the other two. 
Aretaeus and Caelius, meanwhile, operate with an established basic division of 
diseases into acute and chronic. In the former, each item appears twice, first in a 
detailed account of symptomatology and disease progress and then in an account 
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of appropriate treatments; in the latter, treatments follow on from the accounts of 
symptoms, and there is also more theoretical material and engagement with the 
views of rivals. (In Aretaeus, however, some aetiological discussion is present, 
too, and in particular there is a clear humoral model underlying his account; and in 
Caelius, as already observed, the underlying model is the Methodist one, though 
this is often unobtrusive.) Celsus, while acknowledging the acute–chronic distinc-
tion, divides diseases rather into those which affect the body as a whole (book 3, 
containing a typological account of fevers, as well the account of insania ) and 
those with a specific location (4). But a key feature of all these accounts is the 
focus on nosology, that is, on a classification into a number of named diseases, 
understood as clearly identifiable and distinct entities, with specific symptomatol-
ogy, disease course and treatment. These disease types include a number which 
involve a strong psychological element, as we shall consider in more detail later. 
Galen, by contrast, wrote no such work organised according to named diseases 
and their characteristics. His nosological views must rather be gathered from a 
range of works offering analyses of physiology, of the fundamental principles 
of disease classification, of the theory and practice of clinical medicine. In line 
with our previous observation, what is central is an understanding of the internal 
workings of the body, the nature of its natural functions and the physical events 
or circumstances which lead to their impairment. This does not mean that named 
or in some sense ‘reified’ disease entities wholly recede in importance or are not 
discussed in his work; on the contrary, the traditional range, including  phrenitis, 
mania, lēthargos, elephantiasis, is prominently present. But they do not provide 
the principle of organisation of his medical works, and the focus is usually on the 
disease as understood in relation to Galen’s fundamental explanatory schemes, 
namely that of the operation of natural functions and, underlying all, that of the 
mixture of fundamental elements (hot, cold, wet and dry); and, in some cases, that 
of specific location in the body. 
In some ways, this seems a fundamental difference between Galen and our other 
main medical sources. In others, we see considerable congruence, and may even 
question how much difference the different theoretical models make in practice. 
Two considerations in particular may provoke such a doubt. One is the very 
considerable overlap – already mentioned – in physical remedies offered. 34 The 
other is that – in spite of the methodological approach outlined – there are points 
at which Galen does in fact seem to adopt a large amount of the ‘disease entity’
discourse, in particular contexts. One such is the discussion of melancholia. 
Galen’s fullest account of  melancholia comes in his major clinical work, 
Affected Places. This seems to be heavily indebted to earlier typologies of melan-
choly, especially that of Rufus of Ephesus (ca. first to second century CE). (It also 
includes in extenso quotations from the fourth-century BCE medical authority 
Diocles of Carystus.)35 Both facts are significant. On the one hand, Galen is oper-
ating with a model focused strongly on specific bodily location. This is the organ-
ising principle of the whole treatise; and in the specific area of cognitive or brain 
impairments, he attempts a detailed account based on differential pathology of the 
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model, he also distinguishes types and ramifications of melancholia according to 
the place in the body where the melancholic fluid is contained (e.g. throughout 
the whole body or just within the brain; see also n. 28). But it is perhaps also sig-
nificant that when considering in detail the features of melancholia as a disease 
concept, his analysis seems to be largely one taken from the earlier tradition. 
More on melancholia 
It will be useful to say a little more about the history of melancholia, in spite of 
the fact that this is not an easy history to write.36 But consideration of what we 
can tell of the post-Hippocratic developments will help concentrate our attention 
on the phenomenon already mentioned, whereby terms used in the corpus become 
(at some point in the long gap between that and our next major texts) crystallised 
into distinct disease entities. 
As we have seen, melancholia itself has an unclear role in the Hippocratic 
Corpus; but it seems clear that it has not acquired the features and outline of a 
distinct disease concept. We have inadequate evidence for the concept, from a 
period either contemporary with or earlier than the Hippocratic Corpus, or from 
the five-century hiatus already mentioned. But two texts of particular significance 
do survive from this ‘gap’, the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems, book 30, and the 
pseudo-Hippocratic epistolary narrative of Epistles 10–17.37 
Neither is properly speaking a medical text; but both provide evidence of an 
educated, philosophical/scientific discourse on melancholia in (probably) the 
second to first century BCE. It is the Problems that gives us our first glimpse of 
melancholia as the complex and multivalent concept which we know from later 
authors. Here we have melancholia both as temporary, physically based affliction 
and as complex character type; melancholia involving both depression and over-
excitement or laughter; melancholia as associated with intellectual brilliance 
and with the achievements of outstanding or great men from history or mythol-
ogy. The pseudo-Hippocratic Epistles, meanwhile, reflect some similar concepts 
and also bear witness to the possibility of an intense philosophical debate which 
might arise in relation to such complex psychological ‘pathologies’. Should 
Democritus’ apparently anti-social behaviour and mad laughter attract a straight-
forward medical diagnosis (that of melancholia) or be understood rather as a 
sane reaction to the social pathology all round him – a sign of his nature as a true 
philosopher?38 
One cannot, of course, know to what extent these texts reflect a widespread 
understanding of melancholia as a complex psycho-social (dis)order. Consider-
ation of the term’s history and of its usage in non-medical texts arguably point in 
different directions. On the one hand, the word’s etymology (from ‘black bile’) 
or literal meaning suggest traditional associations with darkness, night and fear;39 
on the other, it is clear that by the fourth century BCE the verb may be used in 
the fairly general sense of ‘to be mad’, ‘to be out of one’s mind’. 40 Meanwhile, as 
already clear from Galen’s use of earlier medical authority including Diocles, the 
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and physical aetiologies of melancholia, in technical medical literature in a period 
probably not long after that of the Hippocratic Corpus. 
Do we see here an interaction between traditional or popular disease concepts 
and the schematisations of doctors – or perhaps rather the traces of a traditional 
or popular concept which is developed in different ways in different technical 
(and semi-technical) authors? It is perhaps tempting, albeit with insufficient evi-
dence, to think so. What is clear is that by the time of the first/second century CE, 
melancholia has acquired some kind of distinct status, and is associated with a 
somewhat complex and sometimes contradictory set of symptoms. Clear, too, that 
both medical and other authors, while having recourse to the single, overarching 
concept of melancholia, at the same time employ that concept in complex and dif-
ferentiated ways, identifying types or varieties within it, in an attempt to explain 
a challenging range of patient experiences and symptoms. 
In both Aretaeus and Galen, for example, there is a certain complexity of psy-
chological manifestations. As Aretaeus says, ‘they do not all suffer  melancholia
(μελαγχολῶσι) in one form; rather, some are suspicious of medicine, some seek 
solitude through revulsion from humankind, some turn to superstition, some hate 
living’.41 Galen records the dual experience of suicidal leanings combined with 
fear of death; he also mentions a number of anxieties or even paranoid delusions in 
the context of the condition.42 But in each there is also an attempt (which in Galen’s 
case we have already partially considered) to offer aetiologically based differen-
tiae within the general disease category. Aretaeus’ initial distinction is between 
cases where black bile ‘appears from above’ and others where it ‘descends below’
(3.5, 39,10–11 Hude), as well as further specifications on the basis of its travel 
to particular organs. He also makes an association with anger and with madness, 
offering, apparently as his own distinctive opinion, the view that ‘ melancholia is a 
beginning and a part of mania’.43 Caelius, too, presents melancholia as a condition 
involving both behavioural and physical symptoms (while rejecting the traditional 
aetiological account in terms of black bile), although it is somewhat striking how 
small a place melancholia occupies in his treatise as a whole.44 
But the way in which this complex psychological disease entity is – and is 
not – incorporated in Galen’s discourse is, perhaps, particularly interesting. On 
the one hand, we have seen some psychological complexity, and also the discus-
sion in Affected Places with its differentiated account of types of  melancholia
(although, as already observed, his most differentiated account of it seems heavily 
dependent on earlier authors). On the other, it is striking how largely absent the 
noun is throughout most of his work – even in his dedicated work on ‘black bile’. 
Chiara Thumiger’s comment on linguistic features of  melancholia in the Hip-
pocratic Corpus may, indeed, be adapted for Galen, as follows: the term appears 
in Galen very predominantly as an adjective (melancholikos); and that adjective 
refers usually to substances in the body or to ailments related to black bile, but not 
to melancholia itself.45 Perhaps it is significant that in one of the few cases where 
Galen is using the term to refer to a chronic or episodic depressive condition, 
rather than to a particular kind of substance or related physical ailment, the condi-
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Although the situation is not a straightforward one, we again see Galen’s pref-
erence for accounts in terms of the mixture of fundamental elements, and their 
consequent effects in the body, as against accounts in terms of reified disease 
entities – let alone accounts which highlight the phenomenology of the disease – 
which seem, at least to some extent, to be items taken over from a different 
tradition. 
Digression: fevers as disease entities 
Again, however – and perhaps to emphasise once more the extent to which the 
Galenic position is not a straightforward one – it is important to bear in mind 
certain contexts in which Galen does, indeed, seem to work with defined disease 
entities. The most important one seems to be that of fevers. Fevers, in fact, rep-
resent another case where a medical concept which is present in some form in 
the Hippocratic Corpus47 has developed by the first century CE into a defined 
and articulated set of discrete disease items which play a central role in diag-
nostic theory and clinical practice; the medical concept, indeed, will continue to 
have this status throughout later antiquity, mediaeval and early modern times. 
We already noted the prominent position of fevers in Celsus, who presents them 
first in his list of diseases which affect the whole body and divides them into the 
already well-defined typology of quotidian, tertian, quartan. Fever has now also 
become a widely accepted marker within psychological disturbance, demarcating 
the boundary between phrenitis (a form of derangement or delirium accompanied 
by fever) and mania (the same without fever). 
The crucial role of fevers in Galen’s diagnostic and clinical practice is shown 
in a number of ways. There is the substantial work explicitly devoted to ‘distinct 
types of fever’ (De differentiis febrorum), as well as the works on crises and on 
critical days (De crisibus, De diebus decretoriis) – medical concepts which them-
selves have an intimate relationship with fevers (it is typically fevers whose crisis 
or critical day the doctor is investigating). Then, there is the central importance of 
the pulse as a diagnostic and prognostic tool; this, too, bears a very close relation-
ship with fever in Galenic theory: fevers are prominent among the items which 
can be identified and predicted by the pulse. Fever diagnosis and prognosis play 
an important part, too, in the narrative of the autobiographical work, Prognosis – a 
work which explicitly points to the previously-mentioned works on fever, crises, 
critical days as the main ones from which the reader will gain a theoretical under-
standing of Galen’s prognostic procedure. Moreover, the single work of Galen’s 
which seems closest to functioning as a practical handbook for the practising 
doctor – The Therapeutic Method, to Glaucon – is very substantially dominated 
by an account of the different types of fever. 
What is most interesting from our point of view, however, is not just the impor-
tance of fevers as a diagnostic category, but the very explicit sense in which Galen 
presents them as distinct, clearly defined and real items. Although the aetiologi-
cal analysis mentioned earlier applies here, too – indeed, Galen very explicitly 
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and throughout his analysis continues to make distinctions on the basis of the dif-
ferent aetiologies of fever – it is also true that fevers, once they have arisen, are to 
be classified and treated as nosologically distinct items.49 
Is there a distinct category of mental disorder? 
Having discussed the question of disease definition and the status of disease enti-
ties from a broader perspective, we turn to the question of whether there is a 
distinct category of the mental or psychological in the medical pathologies under 
discussion. The question may be considered under two heads: principles of clas-
sification and nature of treatment. 
The absence of a separate category of the psychological in the Hippocratic 
Corpus has been commented on before.50 Very few, and unrepresentative, texts 
use the term psychē, or have a theory of it; and the pattern throughout most of 
the relevant writings is that psychological symptoms are mentioned alongside 
other symptoms, as part of a collection or syndrome, with no distinct focus on the 
‘mental’ aspect. 
The two texts already considered for the post-Hippocratic history of melancho-
lia, meanwhile, clearly do involve a more specific focus on anomalous mental 
events, character types or ethical behaviour, and their relationship to the medi-
cal discourse. The pseudo-Hippocratic  Epistles, in particular, invoke a potential 
debate or conflict between philosophical and medical accounts in relation to mad-
ness – a point to which we will return further below. 
In Celsus, Aretaeus and Caelius, the situation is somewhat complex. Psycho-
logical, or ‘belonging to the psychē’, is not a category explicitly invoked or used 
as a principle of classification.51 On the other hand, the distinctive nature, and 
importance, of the ailments which we term psychological may be said to emerge 
in these authors, in different ways. One point which is worth mentioning is the 
very prominence of psychological disorders – or at least disorders with a psycho-
logical element – in each of these authors. In Celsus, as we have seen, insania
features early on in the account of those illnesses which affect the whole body; 
and the elaborate distinction of three types of insania again highlights Celsus’
focus on and interest in this particular category. 
Aretaeus, interestingly, does invoke the notion of a pathology of the soul as dis-
tinct from that of the body; but by this remark he is pointing to the fact that there 
are ‘soul’ and ‘body’ symptoms  within a particular disease item, not characteris-
ing a separate category of disease.52 His work in general fits the pattern of includ-
ing mental or experiential symptoms alongside general or physical symptoms, 
although certainly most of the symptoms of melancholia and mania (3.5–6) are 
alterations of mood or forms of cognitive or sensory impairment. Aretaeus’ prin-
ciple of organisation of his different diseases – beyond that of acute and chronic – 
is not entirely clear. Still, there seems a clear thematic sense in the grouping of 
mania, melancholia and epilēpsia together, in close proximity. The connection is 
not, explicitly, that they are affections of the head; in fact, he states that  mania is 
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is an affection which does involve injury to the head (and leads to hallucina-
tion).53 But they are related by a specific aetiology: they represent three different 
possible outcomes following from another affection,  skotōma (= ‘darkening’ or 
dizziness), the difference depending on whether yellow bile, black bile or phlegm 
predominates.54 It is also an interesting aspect of Aretaeus’ account of  epilēpsia
that he focuses so strongly on shame as a part of the subjective experience associ-
ated with this disorder. Certainly, it is not a defining diagnostic feature; however, 
this unique and distressing experience, arising from the dramatic departure from 
one’s normal self, may be seen as placing  epilēpsia in a rather distinct category, 
in Aretaeus’ attitude to it. 55 
Let us turn to what these three authors say about treatment and consider in 
what sense it may be seen as distinctive. It is noteworthy that both Aretaeus and 
Caelius suggest a range of environmental, cognitive and interactive interventions 
to address these ailments; and that in doing so they present us with an insight into 
an aspect of ancient healthcare which is largely absent from Galen. Thus, Are-
taeus recommends peace and quiet, a minimalist decor, sometimes darkness, and 
calming activities for the over-excited condition of  phrenitis, with appropriately 
opposite prescriptions for the depressed one of lēthargos.56 Caelius’ treatment for 
phrenitics includes the use of gentle and soothing language,57 while that for furor
(= Greek mania) involves appropriate verbal interactions. One should challenge 
the patient without, on the other hand, disagreeing to the point of aggravating the 
passio;58 in a recuperative phase of the sickness, one should encourage stimula-
tion through reading aloud, including texts which contain deliberate errors, and 
attendance at stage performances, as well as vocal exercise and engagement with 
intellectual questions; the therapeutic value of philosophical discourse is sug-
gested here, too.59 Some of these environmental and interactive procedures are 
also recommended by Celsus in his account of insania (though there is a focus 
here on constraint and even on flogging, which is apparently recommended for the 
most serious form of insania, that in which there is delusion due to the patient’s 
consilium, or capacity for judgement).60 
It remains the case that the previously-mentioned interventions are rather the 
exception, and are included alongside a much longer list of physical interventions 
which belong to the standard repertory of Graeco-Roman medicine: diet, topical 
applications, drugs, including emetics; in more severe cases, blood-letting. (An 
unfortunate gap in our evidence should also be mentioned, in the case of Aretaeus: 
the extant text lacks ch. 7.6, which covered the treatment of mania.) 
We turn to Galen’s position, in relation to both the classification and the treat-
ment of psychological disorders. Galen, as we have seen, gives an analysis of 
disease in terms of impairment of function (and sometimes focuses also on loca-
tion of an affection). On the basis of a series of subdivisions of this fundamental 
category of impairment of function, he is able to identify a specific category of 
impairment of psychic function, with further sub-classifications within that (see 
the references in n. 16); this, then, looks very much like a definition, with further 
specification, of a category of mental disorder. 
This allows us to give psychological disorders a theoretical place in Galen’s 
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analysis relates to clinical experience or practice – or indeed to classifications 
used elsewhere.61 The abstract classificatory scheme suggests a range of differ-
ent ailments which would belong in different parts of the ‘table’. But in terms of 
description of particular clinical manifestations, let alone case histories, the focus 
is on a few distinct patterns. The distinction between  phrenitis and mania emerges 
as central in the classification of mental aberration. So, too, does the distinction 
between two different forms of derangement, one involving hallucination but with 
reasoning intact, the other with cognitive ability damaged but unimpaired visual 
images; but these are both contained within the single category of paraphrosynē. 
Galen recounts two vivid case histories (in Symp. Diff. 3), one of a person with 
his cognitive faculties otherwise unaffected, but suffering from the hallucination 
of pipe-players present in his house, the other of a person who sees everything 
correctly but acts irrationally, throwing objects (and people) from his window. 
It is noteworthy that Aretaeus offers a similar distinction between hallucinating 
and not hallucinating as a defining one between phrenitis and mania; and indeed 
Galen himself elsewhere offers partially the same cases as indicative of different 
types within the category of phrenitis.62 It seems that there is some fluidity as 
to how fundamental conceptual distinctions map onto the distinctions between 
named diseases. 
On the other hand, one may argue, especially in the case of Galen, that nosolog-
ical distinctions are to an important extent motivated by physiological–anatomical 
theory: in Affected Places, the distinction between hallucination with rationality 
intact and the converse condition finds a justification in terms of which specific 
capacity of the hēgemonikon, or ‘leading-part’, of the soul is suffering impair-
ment.63 There is, further, some attempt, though this seems somewhat unclear and 
less than fully developed, to map the specific types of impairment onto specific 
locations or substances within the brain.64 This leads us on to an important related 
point: that location in the brain may itself constitute a classificatory criterion of 
‘mental’ illness. Galen’s insistence on the brain as the centre of cognitive, percep-
tive and motor function, controversial in his own time, came finally to dominate 
the medical discourse. In a group of later authors, usually known as compilers 
or encyclopaedists, we find a grouping together of psychological disorders, but 
without any clear or explicit statement of the rationale behind that grouping. It 
seems overwhelmingly likely that the grouping is, in fact, based on this albeit 
unstated Galenic understanding of the role of the brain,65 and that in this limited 
sense therefore there may be said to be a distinct category of mental impairment 
in late antique medicine. In the later period, too, we see the further elaboration 
of the phenomenon mentioned previously as appearing in Galen in undeveloped 
form, namely the assignation of different kinds of cognitive impairment to differ-
ent parts of the brain.66 
We should, finally, consider the distinctness or otherwise of psychological dis-
orders in Galen’s treatment of them. Here, we may say that on the whole the 
picture described for the other medical authorities holds for Galen, too. His thera-
peutic approach to such disturbances relies largely on dietetics, topical applica-
tions, drugs and blood-letting – the same kinds of intervention, in short, that are 
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There are, however, some interesting traces of other, non-biological approaches. 
These appear in a few, anecdotal-style accounts of the doctor’s approach to 
patients suffering from certain damaging delusions. Here, the paucity of the mate-
rial, its rather casual or oblique introduction into the text and the fact that it seems 
in at least some cases to be directly borrowed from previous authors seem to cast 
doubt on how real or important a part this was of his clinical experience.67 Both 
some of the more striking ‘case histories’ mentioned – such as that of the man who 
fears that Atlas will tire of holding up the heavens – and some of the more striking 
medical interventions – in particular, those where the doctor pretends to believe in 
the reality of the patient’s delusion, as part of a strategy that will then remove that 
delusion – seem to have been adopted from the existing medical tradition (in the 
latter case, explicitly). It should be said, however, that in a number of prominent 
cases which Galen does present as his own, in Prognosis, an understanding of the 
patient’s own mental state, rather than mere attention to physical manifestations, 
is essential to diagnosis.68 (But it must also be pointed out, too, that the text says 
nothing about ‘cure’ in such cases.) 
With these limited exceptions, then, it seems reasonable to say that Galen’s
approach to the cure of mental disturbances, in the medical sphere, is largely incor-
porated in his general model of clinical medicine. The contrast here with Celsus, Are-
taeus and Caelius is at best a partial one; while these authors do pay more attention
to relational or cognitive approaches, such approaches, as observed, are absorbed in
a discourse with a much more prominent focus on physical interventions.
Ethics and medicine: two accounts of the pathology of the soul 
But that qualification – ‘in the medical sphere’ – is an important one. For Galen’s 
texts give evidence also of a completely different approach to, and categorisation 
of, the pathology of the soul, namely that which derives from the philosophical 
tradition and from ethical literary genres, rather than from medicine.69 
Galen is, to be sure, not alone in this. His work on the pathology of the soul, 
understood in ethical terms, can be situated within the rich discourse on the ‘pas-
sions’, and their philosophical therapy – and written by philosophers rather than 
doctors – that has arisen especially in the first and second centuries CE. Major 
authors within this discourse are, for example, Plutarch, Seneca and Epictetus.70 
What is distinctive about Galen is that he addresses what we may call ‘disorders 
of the soul’ – and indeed classifies them and discusses their treatment in detail – 
within both a medical and an ethical discourse. This naturally leads us to pose 
the question of the relationship between the two discourses, or between the affec-
tions or disorders considered within them. The question is complex and cannot be 
analysed in detail here.71 We may state, however, that the two ways of classifying 
and addressing what are in some sense mental disorders are presented quite sepa-
rately, with no clear account of the relationship between them (even though there 
is at points some overlap in terminology). We have, on the one hand, an ethical 
discourse, addressed towards such disturbances as desire, anger and distress, and 
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we have already considered earlier. In the former, the modes of treatment involve 
personal discipline and training (both intellectual and physical), practices of con-
templation and self-assessment, and interaction with a mentor; in the latter, as 
seen, they involve largely physical interventions. 
The question of the relationship between a philosophical, or largely cognitive,
‘therapy of the word’ and the medical approach to mental pathology is a complex one.
(It is also, for example, relevant to mention a distinction which is explicitly made in
some texts between ‘madness’ as understood in the philosophical, especially Stoic,
tradition – that is, an ethical shortcoming to which practically all of us are subject –
and madness in the straightforwardly medical sense, which will attract treatment of
the balance of humours in the body.) 72 But certainly we may say that philosophi-
cal texts of popular or practical ethics in this period present us with a distinct, and
apparently powerful, approach to certain ailments which might be considered under
the heading of mental disorder, and one which seems to function in parallel to and
separately from the medical one. It is also clear that there was an active debate, evi-
denced by Soranus, Athenaeus and Galen, and among philosophers by Plutarch, as
to whether doctors should also concern themselves with philosophy and the soul and
whether, conversely, philosophers should be interested in medicine. 73 
Having characterised an ‘ethical’ discourse which is separate from the medical 
one, however, we should also consider, finally, some senses in which ethical con-
siderations may become part of a medical pathology. The ethical considerations in 
play here are rather those which derive from societal norms, and which arguably 
function as some form of societal control, than those which belong to the liter-
ary, philosophical tradition. It is notable, for example, that forms of homosexual 
behaviour become medicalised in some writings of the Roman imperial period.74 
Some, indeed, would detect in this period a tendency to pathologise or medicalise 
desire – a focus on the culpable, or voluntary, nature of certain kinds of desire 
(involving both food and sex), which come to be conceptualised as distinct medi-
cal disease entities.75 
Divide and rule: Galenic and post-Galenic tabulae and dihaireseis 
We have already seen some contexts in which Graeco-Roman medicine relies on 
complex schemes of subdivision as a major component of its intellectual, paeda-
gogical and rhetorical approach. One could say much more in this area, especially
in relation to Galen: the remarks so far on the role of classificatory and sub-
divisional schemes in his medical work have given little more than a glimpse of 
this at times apparently almost pathological tendency, and the profusion of com-
plexity which it generates.76 Fever, disease, capacity and activity, sign, fatigue, 
massage and pulse – and indeed medicine itself – are all among the terms which 
invite this classificatory style of analysis and thus this complexity. 
It has also been suggested that there is often a mismatch between the theoretical 
complexity and those factors which turn out to be of actual practical significance 
in clinical and practical approaches described. But there is a broader historical sig-
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end of our historical survey. Galen’s sub-divisional drive may, as already hinted, 
be interpreted partly in paedagogical terms: the logically branching, tabular-style 
organisation of material is something that may have been useful, or impressive, 
in presenting knowledge to students, and may have functioned to some extent as 
a mnemonic tool. 
Whatever the case in Galen, however, this paedagogic role is certainly essential 
in the classificatory schemata which we see in later antiquity. Both in the  Tabulae 
Vindobonenses and in the Alexandrian summaries,  dihaireseis take a central role 
in packaging and making accessible Galenic medical knowledge. These  dihaire-
seis often have an actual graphic counterpart: tables and ‘trees’ were essential 
educational tools in the dissemination of such knowledge, and appear in the actual 
manuscripts of these late antique texts.77 Whether one sees such a classificatory 
drive as a largely sterile intellectual tool – or even an attempt to blind with sci-
ence – or rather as a serious attempt to make sense of the complex data of medical 
experience, it plays a vital role in both Galenic and late antique medical thought 
and education. It may be thought, too, that its distant descendant is still at work 
today, in our perceived need to classify, categorise, tabulate and control the vari-
ety of complex and evasive experiences which we know, or try to understand, 
under the broad heading of mental disorder. 
Conclusion 
A complex picture has emerged in relation to the status of disease entities, and 
their position in the explanatory and classificatory frameworks of medical authors 
of the imperial period; there are complexities, too, in relation to the separate status 
of a category of the mental or psychological. The question is answered differently 
for different authors and in different periods. Certainly we may identify a tendency 
to greater reification of disease entities between the Hippocratic period and the 
Roman imperial one, and also a very broad agreement (albeit with disagreements 
in detail), both in the nature of the symptoms clustered together within such cat-
egories as phrenitis, mania, melancholia and in the approaches to their treatment. 
We must, at the same time, consider two major qualifications to that notion of 
congruence. First, there are the conflicts over explanatory model and underlying 
physical explanation, and – especially in the case of Galen – a tendency, not only 
to focus on aetiology and fundamental causation (including anatomical location) 
as against disease entity, but also to proliferate conceptual categories in a way 
which complicates analysis. Secondly, there are certain striking differences as to 
whether, or to what extent, mental disorders invite a different kind of treatment 
from other ones – and as to whether any such distinct treatment takes place within
the medical domain (as we see in different ways in Aretaeus, Celsus, Caelius and, 
to an extent, Galen) or in a separate, ethical discourse (as we see in both Galen 
and other authors of ‘popular ethics’). Both the identification of mental disorder – 
as bodily pathology, as located in specific bodily parts, or human functions, as 
amphibious between the domain of body and soul, or of medicine and philosophy 
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complex and contested. As, indeed, they continue to, albeit on the basis of very 
different scientific and cultural assumptions, 2000 years on. 
Notes 
1 A useful summary of positions in the recent debate is given by  Broome (2007 ); see also 
more generally Busfield (2011 ). There are further ramifications to and nuances of these 
basic positions. Against Wakefield (1992 ; cf. also  2006 ), insisting on an objective, 
internal criterion of disease associated with his ‘harmful dysfunction’ analysis,  Hor-
witz (2002 ) argues that even the notion of biological dysfunction will contain culture-
specific elements; see also Cooper (2005 ) in a similar vein. For useful discussion of the 
issue in relation to psychiatry, see also  Fulford (1994 );  Papineau (1994 ). 
2 For a summary of this position see Keil and Stoecker (2017 ). (Some have proposed a 
differential terminology – disease, sickness, illness – corresponding to the three ele-
ments, although this has not gained widespread acceptance.) The subjective or ‘phe-
nomenological’ criterion is asserted especially by  Parnas and Zahavi (2002 ). 
3 The ‘cluster concept’ is argued for strongly by  Keil and Stoecker (2017 ), who also 
discuss the gradualism problem (on the latter issue see also Hucklenbroich 2017 ). 
4 The locus classicus for this concept is Plato, Phaedrus 244a–c (with 265a–c). 
5 There is again a range of nuanced positions; see in particular Haslam (2002 ) on ‘kinds 
of kinds’. 
6 Although there is, for example, an ‘insanity plea’, and a concept of exemption from 
or loss of responsibility, in Graeco-Roman legal contexts. See  Konstan (2013 ) and cf. 
next note. 
7 See especially Plato’s Gorgias, which has a strong focus not only on this soul–body 
parallelism, but also on the specific nature of medical expertise – and is a text exploited 
in detail by Galen in his work on the expertise relevant to health, Thrasyboulos. Inter-
estingly, in another context ( Timaeus 86d–e), Plato also argues that the influence of the 
body and its pathology on the soul constitutes a diminution or removal of the agent’s 
responsibility for morally bad action; and this text is used by Galen (QAM, especially 6 
and 10–11) as support for his very strong statement of the physically determined nature 
of ethical states and actions, with challenging consequences for the notion of personal 
responsibility. 
8 Galen was a Greek-speaking physician and intellectual of enormous intellectual scope 
and influence, active at Rome in the second half of the second century CE. His research 
and extant works range from anatomy, through biological and physiological theory, 
disease classification, clinical diagnosis, therapeutics and pharmacology, to ethics and 
logic. A central feature of his work is the way in which it provides a synthesis, both 
of previous medical theory and practice, and (especially in the area of the psychē ) of 
philosophical with medical approaches. 
9 Cf. San. Tu. 1.4; Ars Med. 1.1. He here also criticises some predecessors for defining 
health as a balance in some more absolute or fundamental sense; nonetheless, he also 
at times adopts a harmonising strategy, suggesting (1) that theoretical differences at the 
lower level will be irrelevant when we come to the higher, organic level ( Morb. Diff. 
2–4); (2), more fundamentally, that all major authorities – even his arch-opponents, the 
atomists and particle theorists – agree on the basic notion of balance, even if they may 
not agree what the balance is of (San. Tu. 1.5). The historical veracity of the claim that 
‘balance’ was a universally shared concept in ancient health theory (especially among 
Asclepiadeans and Methodists) seems dubious: on this point see further Grimaudo 
(2008 : 39–45);  Singer (2014 : 976–8). 
10 See especially San. Tu. 1.4–5. On the gradualist concept in ancient medical thought see 
Lewis, Thumiger and van der Eijk (2017) (as well as the items cited in the previous 
note). 
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11 On different kinds of lifestyle and their different prescriptions, see  San. Tu. 1.12 and 
2.1, with Singer (2014 : 984–6); on health defined in relation to the individual, and his 
or her perception of distress, see again San. Tu. 1.5. 
12 E.g. at San. Tu. 4.1. 
13 He distinguishes the regime appropriate for ‘sanus homo, qui . . . bene valet’, who 
will not need to consult a doctor, from those for the ‘imbecillis’ (a category, inciden-
tally, which includes ‘nearly all those devoted to literary studies’), whose daily regime 
requires much closer attention (Med. 1.1–2). 
14 Med. resp., 184 Rose. 
15 Celsus mentions a traditional tripartite division of medicine into dietetic, pharmaceuti-
cal and surgical ( Med. 1, pr.), and indeed devotes the first book of his work to ‘hygien-
ics’ or health-preservation; moreover, Galen’s polemical insistence, in  Thras., that 
hygienics is the domain of the doctor bears witness to a lively competition for authority 
in this area, in particular with gymnastic trainers, who obviously represented a major 
rival to medical expertise. 
16 The main texts in this area are Morb. Diff., Caus. Morb., Symp. Diff., Caus. Symp ., with 
much relevant material also in Loc. Aff., Glauc. and MM. But it is far from easy, in some 
cases, to follow the details of Galen’s sub-divisional procedures, let alone to be clear 
how the differently nuanced analyses in different texts may be mapped onto each other. 
17 Morb. Diff. 1–2. 
18 Given the strong Aristotelian background to the notion of  energeia, one might wish to 
say that this notion of impairment of function conflates, in modern terms, the ‘natural-
ist’ and ‘normative’ accounts, because performance of animal and in particular human 
function is understood in terms of a teleological notion of correct function, or func-
tion that fulfils an organism’s purpose; one might, alternatively, say that the conflict 
between the two is not felt. Still, so long as we are talking about energeia at the level 
of uniform or homogeneous parts, functions referred to are fairly basic biological ones; 
so, at this level, at least, perhaps the larger ‘normative’ question does not yet arise. 
19 Morb. Diff. 2: ‘If health consists in a good-mixture of hot, cold, dry and wet, disease 
(τὸ νοσεῖν) necessarily consists in a bad-mixture of these’. On the fundamental role 
of the bad-mixtures in Galen’s conception of human bodies and their health see also 
Temp., with the discussion of Singer and van der Eijk (2018 , esp. 8–10). 
20 In Symp. Diff. 1, Galen distinguishes between pathos, nosos and symptōma. Properly 
speaking, the term pathos refers to an ongoing alteration, or passive motion, within 
the body, due to some active cause, while  nosos refers to ‘an abnormal state which is 
the primary cause of damage to an activity’; symptōma, meanwhile, is a term of much 
broader application, referring to any unnatural or abnormal event befalling the body, 
irrespectively of whether that event is conceived as a cause or indeed as a consequence 
or sign. (Cf. the similar analysis at MM 2.3.6–7.) 
21 Symp. Diff. 3–4. 
22 See  Padel (1995 );  Most (2013 );  Singer (2018b ). 
23 The astrological discussion in Galen is brief, and not developed in a way which makes it a
significant part of his system (even though the work in question was to become a founda-
tional text for astrological medicine); see Di. Dec. 3.6 (911–13 K.). In the case of Ptolemy,
while some of his remarks on the influence of heavenly bodies can be understood in purely
physical terms, there is also extended discussion of a definitely astrological influence; see
e.g. Tetrabiblos 3.10–14, where especially relevant to our discussion are chapter 12, on
bodily injuries and diseases and chapter 14, on diseases (pathē) of the soul.
24 See Metzger (2018 ) on the debates between Christian theologians and late antique doc-
tors (Christian and pagan), and on the different accounts in those medical sources (e.g. 
Oribasius, Posidonius, Paul of Aegina, Paulus Nicaeus) themselves.  Ephialtēs was a 
night-time attack involving the experience of physical oppression and suffocation. 
25 Morb. Sac. 1 states that the disease known by that name is ‘no more sacred than any 
other’, rather than that it is  not sacred; but it is also important, as Smith (1965 ) argues 
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which may be seen, in the pre-Christian period, as part of the broader repertory of physi-
cal explanations of disease, and the distinct Christian concept of possession. (On the 
later period see now Metzger (2018 ) for a strong statement of the need to resist ‘either– 
or’ causal interpretations in the (pagan and Christian) medical context.) Note also Are-
taeus apparently subscribing to the (Platonic) view that some kinds of mania involve 
divine inspiration: this leads to ‘untaught knowledge of the heavenly bodies, spontane-
ous philosophy, poetic composition due to the Muses’ (3.6, 42 Hude); cf. also ibid., 43–4 
Hude on another type of ‘divine’ madness. He also seems to entertain – without clearly 
endorsing but certainly also without rejecting it – the notion that epilēpsia is an affliction 
visited on those who have transgressed against the Moon (3.4, 38 Hude). 
26 There is, of course, a wide range of texts, espousing or presupposing different theo-
retical models; but one may consider e.g. Nat. Hom., Aff., Morb., Morb. Sac., Vict. as 
prominent examples of works which offer some such fluid- or element-based account 
(for summaries of the doctrine of all the classical-period Hippocratic texts see Craik 
2015 ). But it is at least arguably the case that  Epidemics betokens a greater openness on 
the part of Hippocratic doctors to the variety of patient symptoms and patient experi-
ence, and a lesser tendency to impose their own explanatory model, as compared with, 
in particular, Galen. On this point see  Lloyd (2009 ); also Thumiger (2015, 2018b). 
27 While the following paragraphs contain a number of considerations relevant to this 
question, there is no space to address it directly here. Briefly, however, it may be said 
that there is arguably a tension, within Galen’s own thought, between the holistic 
approach which sees disease as an overall bodily state and the insistence, just men-
tioned, on precise anatomical location; and that there is a quite explicit tension between 
Galen and certain other theorists, especially the Methodists, who argued strongly 
against the relevance of specific bodily locations in the treatment of disease. See fur-
ther Singer (2020 ), as well as the other chapters in Thumiger (2020 ). 
28 The former distinction is at Symp. Diff. 3 (cf. also Loc. Aff. 3.6); the latter is developed 
especially in Loc. Aff., especially 3.6–7. 
29 The best summary in this context – both of Galen’s own views and his polemic and 
of the outline views of the Empirics and Methodists – is provided by Galen, SI ; along 
similar lines see also the preface to Celsus, Med. 
30 It seems clear, for example, that certain kinds of topical application to the head, as well 
as emetics and in some cases blood-letting, constituted a standard repertory of ancient 
medical interventions for a range of mental disturbances. On these points, especially as 
relevant to Galen and Archigenes, see  Lewis (2018 ). 
31 Thumiger (2013 ); on Hippocratic ‘mental’ concepts and pathologies more broadly, see 
also Thumiger (2017 ). Further perspectives on the problems of ancient psychiatric dis-
ease classification, relevant also to the later periods which we shall consider, are given 
by Jouanna (2013 ), and, from a modern clinical perspective, by  Hughes (2013 ). 
32 Thumiger (2013 : 65–70), also citing the theoretical work in this area of  Halliday 
(2004 ). 
33  Thumiger (2013 : 70). 
34 See now the chapters of Coughlin, Devinant, Singer and especially Lewis in Thumiger 
and Singer (2018 ). 
35 See Galen, Loc. Aff. 3.10, with Pormann (2008 , esp. 170–8, 265 and 266–87). Further 
on Diocles, known only through fragments and testimonies in later authors, see van der 
Eijk (2000 ). 
36 Still essential is Flashar (1966 ) and, for both the ancient and the later history of the 
concept, Klibansky et al. (1964 ); cf.  Rütten (1992 ). 
37 Both are of uncertain date, although the former is usually placed in the century or so 
after Aristotle (i.e. some time in the second century BCE), and the latter in the first 
century either BCE or CE. On the pseudo-Hippocratic text see Rütten (1992 ) and now 
 Kazantzidis (2018 ). 
38 In ps.-Aristotle, Problems 30.1, the complex and outstanding characteristics of certain 
great men (e.g. Heracles, Ajax, Plato, Empedocles) are attributed to their melancholic 
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nature. The narrative of ps.-Hippocrates, Epistles 10–17 presents the anomalous
behaviour of Democritus, the ‘laughing philosopher’, with arguments as to whether 
this behaviour should be medicalised (as melancholy) or not. 
39 Such traditional associations of darkness are explored by Padel (1992 ,  1995 ; cf.  Kliban-
sky et al. 1964 : 15–16), and are arguably still present in Galen’s account of melancholy 
in terms of darkness in the brain at Loc. Aff. 3.10 (191 Kühn). 
40 See e.g. Demosthenes, Or. 48.56, speaking of a person as ‘not only unjust, but actu-
ally giving the appearance of being mad (μελαγχολᾶν δοκῶν)’; Plato, Phaedrus 268e, 
referring to a colloquial way of saying ‘you’re insane’ (μελαγχολᾷς). Plato also uses the 
adjective (μελαγχολικός), again in a purely negative sense, with reference to the char-
acter flaws associated with a tyrant (Republic 573c). We find a similarly colloquial, 
non-technical sense in Aristophanes ( Birds 14; Wealth 12, 366, 903). 
41 3.5, 40,1–3 Hude. 
42 Caus. Symp. 2.7; Loc. Aff. 3.10. 
43 Aretaeus 3.5, 39,27–28. 
44 Chron. 1.6.180–84. 
45 See At. Bil. especially 3–4 and 6, focusing on black bile as a substance, its physical 
location and related bodily illnesses (e.g. elephantiasis) and cures; a range of other 
Galenic texts in the same way speak of melancholic substances or ailments, rather than 
of melancholia itself; and a similar point could be made for mania. For further discus-
sion and citations see Singer (2018a : 403–5); and further on Galen’s approach(es) to 
black bile, see Stewart (2019 ). 
46 Galen, Hipp. Aph. 6.67 (78–79 Kühn). A similar point may be made about another 
famous ancient disease category,  hysteria, where again the discussion seems distanced 
and to some extent based on a classification used by others (here, midwives or nurses); 
see Loc. Aff. 6.5 (413ff. Kühn) and again  Singer (2018a : 406–7). 
47 At Epidemics 1.24–26, indeed, there is already a detailed typology of fevers, according 
to their different characteristics and in particular periodicities; still, the complexity of 
the analysis is much elaborated in later times, especially by Galen. 
48 Caus. Morb. 1.1: ‘fever is an unbalanced heat of the living being as a whole’ (as 
opposed to more localised heat, which will not constitute fever). 
49 The main account is in Diff. Feb.; note 1.1, where fevers are again characterised in 
terms of a particular kind (genos) of abnormal heat, and where the Aristotelian ‘essen-
tialist’ language (this is the  ousia of a fever) is perhaps significant. 
50 See  Singer (1992 );  Gundert (2000 );  Thumiger (2013 ). 
51 But Caelius does use the term mens (= mind, intelligence) in relation to the pathology 
of phrenitis (Acut. 1.pr.4), and Aretaeus similarly refers sometimes to  psychē (see next 
paragraph); Caelius also distinguishes the category of health ‘of the soul’ ( animae ) in 
the context of a broad discussion of health (Med. resp., 184 Rose). 
52 Aretaeus 3.1 (36 Hude), in the introductory discussion of chronic diseases: some not 
only consume the body, but also distort the senses and even make mad the soul, through 
the poor mixture of the body; mania and melancholia are known to be of this sort. 
53 Aretaeus 3.6 (41–43 Hude). 
54 3.3 (38 Hude). 
55 3.4 (38 Hude) and even more strongly 7.4 (152 Hude): ‘If they could see what they 
undergo during an attack, they would not be able to endure life any more’. 
56 Aretaeus 5.1 (especially 91–92 Hude) and 5.2 (especially 98 Hude). 
57 Acut. 1.11.98–99; cf. also 1.11.80–82 (use of people known to the patient; need to 
persuade, or sometimes deceive or threaten). 
58 Chron. 1.5.156–57. (Caelius also attests, without subscribing, to the use of certain 
kinds of music, as well as flogging, and the employment of love as a remedy, all of 
which were recommended by certain other doctors: ibid. 175–79.) 
59 Chron. 1.5.162–67. 
60 Celsus, Med. 3.18. 
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61 It is noticeable that the central concepts of mania and phrenitis do not appear in this 
schematisation at Symp. Diff. 3, although they are discussed in a further classification at 
Caus. Symp. 2.7; for further discussion of Galen’s schematisations see  Singer (2018a ). 
62 At Loc. Aff. 4.2. 
63 That is to say: hallucination is an affection of the perceptive ( aisthētikos ) faculty, 
impairment of rationality is an affection of the reasoning ( dianoētikos) faculty, which 
are both distinct items within the overall ‘psychic’ category; and either may be affected 
independently of the other. There are, similarly, impairments of memory ( mnēmē ), dis-
cussed at Loc. Aff. 3.6 (cf. Mot. Musc. 2.6, discussing also the role of the capacity 
for image formation (phantasioumenon)), on which see now Julião (2018 ). Cf. also 
 Jouanna (2009 );  Devinant (2018 );  Singer (2018a ). 
64 See Loc. Aff. 3.6; 3.10. 
65 See now Gäbel (2018 ), discussing this issue in relation to Oribasius of Pergamon 
(fourth century), Alexander of Tralles (sixth century), Aëtius of Amida (sixth century) 
and Paul of Aegina (seventh century). The position is not equally clear in each of these 
cases, and in the case of such texts it may also be questionable to what extent a definite 
or worked-out physiological theory is in fact in play; but it seems clear at least that the 
Galenic brain-centred view has had a dominant influence. 
66 On the embryonic existence of this differentiation in Galen, and on its later develop-
ment, see Julião (2018 ) and  Gäbel (2018 ). 
67 This point, as well as the nature of Galen’s range of therapeutic approaches to men-
tal disorder more generally, is further discussed by both  Devinant (2018 ) and  Singer 
(2018a ) (who also consider the ‘case histories’ mentioned here in more detail). 
68 Famously, Galen diagnoses the lovesickness of a Roman lady, using a combination 
of pulse diagnosis and knowledge of circumstantial details; knowledge or conjecture 
about a mental state is relevant to other remarkable ‘diagnoses’ in this text too. See 
Praen. 6. 
69 Galen’s main works in this vein are  Avoidance of Distress and Affections and Errors; 
for translation and commentary see Singer (2013 ). 
70 On this genre, and on Galen’s relationship to it, see especially  Gill (2010 ), as well as 
Singer (2013 , chapter 3, introduction). 
71 See Singer (2013 ,  2017 ,  2018a ; also for further bibliography on Galen on the soul). 
72 On the subject in general see Ahonen (2014 ), and specifically on this distinction, Aho-
nen (2018 ); cf. also  Kazantzidis (2013 ). 
73 For relevant texts see now Coughlin (2018 ). 
74 See Caelius, Chron. 4.9, on molles or malthakoi, i.e. passive or effeminate men; Ptol-
emy also identifies such a pathological character type. 
75 See Thumiger (2018a). 
76 For an analysis of not just medical, but other ancient scientific writing in these terms 
see Barton (1994 ). 
77 See especially  Gundert (1998 );  Ieraci Bio (2003 ). 
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